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Peanuts and Potatoes: The FCC's
Diversification Policy and the
Antitrust Laws
by DENNIS M. CUSACK*
Truth and understanding are not wares like peanuts or
potatoes.
1
I
Introduction
Since 1940, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
has regulated the market structure of the broadcasting indus-
try through an assortment of ownership rules. For example,
"cross-ownership" rules prohibit a broadcast licensee from also
owning a newspaper or cable television system in the same lo-
cal market,2  while "multiple-ownership" rules prohibit any
one firm from owning more than one broadcast license in a lo-
cal market.' In addition, the FCC imposes a ceiling on the total
number of television and radio stations a single firm can own
nationally.4
The ownership rules advance the FCC's policy of "diversifica-
Member, Third Year Class; B.A., Yale University 1979. The author wishes to,;
thank Louise for the rides home from the library.
1. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (affirming injunction against enforcement of news agency's by-laws that re-
stricted membership and forbade members from furnishing news to non-members).
2. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(c) (1984) (prohibiting ownership of a "cognizable interest"
in newspaper and broadcast licenses in the same local market); 47 C.F.R. § 76.501
(1984) (prohibiting ownership of cable television system by any national network, or
by any local television licensee). A "cognizable interest" is any partnership or direct
ownership, or any voting stock interest equal to 5% or more of the outstanding voting
stock. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555, Note 2.
3. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a) (1984) (prohibiting ownership of cognizable interests in
more than one broadcast license in the same service and in the same market); 47
C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (1984) (prohibiting ownership of cognizable interests in TV and
AM or TV and FM licenses in the same local market).
4. The Code of Federal Regulations provides that-
(1) No license for a commercial AM, FM or TV broadcast station shall be
granted, transferred or assigned to any party (including all parties under
common control) if the grant, transfer or assignment of such license would
result in such party or any of its stockholders, partners, members, officers or
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tion.' ' 5 By placing the channels of communication under the
control of as many different speakers as possible, the FCC in-
tends to promote affirmatively what the first amendments pro-
tects passively: the free dissemination of diverse ideas.7 As a
secondary goal, diversification is also intended to prevent un-
due economic concentration.8
In recent years the FCC has aggressively deregulated the
broadcasting industry.9 Citing the remarkable transformations
in the video marketplace wrought by new technologies such as
cable television,1° video cassette recorders (VCRs)," subscrip-
directors, directly or indirectly, owning, operating or controlling, or having a
cognizable interest in, either:.
(i) more than fourteen (14) stations in the same service, or
(ii) more than twelve (12) stations in the same service which are not mi-
nority-controlled.
(2) No license for a commercial TV broadcast station shall be granted, trans-
ferred or assigned to any party (including all parties under common control)
if the grant, transfer or assignment of such license would result in such party
or any of its stockholders, partners, members, officers or directors, directly or
indirectly, owning, operating or controlling, or having a cognizable interest
in, either.
(i) TV stations which have an aggregate national audience reach exceeding
thirty (30) percent, or
(ii) TV stations which have an aggregate national audience reach exceed-
ing twenty-five (25) percent and which are not minority-controlled.
47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (as amended Feb. 1, 1985).
5. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 780-81
(1978) (affirming the Commission's prohibition on local newspaper/television
combinations).
6. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press ....
7. FCC v. NCCB, 436 U.S. at 780-81. For a Commission statement of the policy,
see Matter of Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's
Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Sta-
tions, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, para. 99 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Newspaper/TV Order].
8. "Sometimes, this [antitrust] policy will yield, however, to the even higher
goals of diversity and the delivery of quality broadcasting service to the American
people." Newspaper/TV Order, supra note 7, at para. 99.
9. See, e.g., Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertain-
ment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Sta-
tions, Report and Order, 49 Fed. Reg. 33,588 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Deregulation
of Television]; In the Matter of Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d
968 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Deregulation of Radio]. For a deregulation manifesto
penned by current Commission Chairman Mark S. Fowler and his Legal Assistant,
Daniel L. Brenner, see Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Reg-
ulation, 60 TEx. L. REv. 207 (1982).
10. Cable television operates by receiving broadcast signals via satellite, micro-
wave, or telephone transmission, and retransmitting these signals to customers over
coaxial cable. Cable television can provide as many as 108 channels to viewers.
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tion television (STV),1 2  multi-point distribution services
(MDS), 13 low-power television (LPTV),14 and direct broadcast
satellite systems (DBS),'5 the FCC has conducted rulemaking
proceedings to remove content 16 and ownership 7 regulations
from existing services and to deregulate ab initio new services
as they enter the market."
Two recent FCC rulemaking proceedings serve as striking
examples of the Commission's deregulatory fervor. In 1980, the
FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry9 into proposed rules for the
new direct broadcast satellite service. After receiving com-
ments from interested parties, the FCC, as it originally in-
tended, decided not to impose multiple-channel or cross-media
11. Video cassete recorders allow viewers to tape broadcast or cable signals on
magnetic tape. This allows "time shifting" of television shows as well as the rental or
purchase of movies, educational programs, and various other shows on cassette tapes.
See Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) for a discussion of the copy-
right infringement aspects of VCRs.
12. STV is a technology whereby signals are scrambled before they are broadcast.
Customers then "subscribe" to the use of a "box" to unscramble the signal that is
received.
13. MDS is simply broadcasting signals at microwave frequency. Unlike cable tel-
evision, MDS does not require extensive facilities and may compete well with cable in
urban areas.
14. LPTV is television broadcast at lower power than is normally used in order to
reach a very limited area. This allows the proliferation of many stations broadcasting
on the same frequency.
15. DBS signals can be received only through the use of satellite dishes. The ex-
panding network of communications satellites can result in the potential receipt of
hundreds of different stations.
16. See Inquiry into the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, 49 Fed. Reg. 20,317 (1984). The fairness doctrine requires broadcasters to
present full and balanced coverage of issues of public controversy. See Report on Edi-
torializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). Congress ratified the fair-
ness doctrine in an amendment to § 315 of Title 47 of the United States Codes. The
FCC ultimately decided that, although it felt the doctrine had outlived its usefulness,
only Congress could repeal it. General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, Report, 50 Fed. Rg. 35,418 (1985).
17. See, e.g., Repeal of the "Regional Concentration of Control" Provisions of the
Commission's Multiple Ownership Rules, Report and Order, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,670
(1984), appeal pending sub. nom. National Ass'n for Better Broadcasting v. FCC, No.
84-1274 (D.C. Cir.) (filed June 29, 1984).
18. See, e.g., Development of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct Broadcast
Satellites for the Period Following the 1983 Regional Administrative Radio Confer-
ence, Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 676 (1982), affd in part and rev'd in part, Na-
tional Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (hereinafter cited as
DBS Order].
19. Development of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct Broadcast Satellites
for the Period Following the 1983 Regional Administrative Radio Conference, Notice
of Inquiry, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,719 (1980).
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ownership restrictions on DBS licensees.20 More dramatically,
on August 6, 1984, the Commission adopted a Final Rule that
would have raised the limit on the total number of AM, FM,
and TV stations any individual could own from seven (the
"Seven Station Rule") in each medium to twelve (the '"Twelve
Station Rule").2 ' Moreover, the Final Rule included a "sunset"
provision removing all ceilings on ownership by 1990.2 On re-
consideration--and under intense pressure from Congress-the
FCC added a cap on the total audience that each owner could
reach (the "audience-reach cap") to the twelve-station limit
and repealed the sunset provision.?
In both its decision to amend the Seven Station Rule and its
decision to leave DBS unregulated, the FCC declared emphati-
cally that the video marketplace is competitive enough to check
any undue accumulations of broadcasting power.24 If competi-
tion should fail to advance the FCC's diversification policy, the
Commission stated, the antitrust laws can effectively correct
market imperfections.' It said that new and changing technol-
ogies need to be tested and given the opportunity to mature in
an unregulated marketplace before the Commission can decide
how best to protect the public interest.2 The FCC also prom-
ised to continue to monitor transactions that might unaccept-
ably reduce media diversification.7 Thus, the FCC proposed to
retreat to a defensive position with respect to its mandate
under the Communications Act of 1934 ("the Communications
Act")28 to promote the "public convenience, interest, or neces-
sity."29 The fate of the public's interest in diverse and antago-
20. DBS Order, supra note 18, at paras. 91-98.
21. Amendment of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of
AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,877,
para. 5 (adopted July 26, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Twelve Station Order].
22. 1d
23. Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 4666 (released Feb. 1, 1985) [hereinafter cited as
Twelve Station Order Reconsidered].
24. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at para. 74; DBS Order, supra note 18, at
para. 95.
25. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at para. 78; DBS Order, supra note 18, at
para. 95.
26. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at paras. 109-11; DBS Order, supra note
18, at para. 81.
27. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at para. 108; DBS Order, supra note 18,
at para. 98.
28. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-611 (West 1962 & Supp. 1985).
29. Section 303 of the Communications Act provides:
[Vol. 7
THE FCC AND ANTITRUST LAWS
nistic sources of news and ideas would be left to the economics
of the broadcast/video marketplace.
This note first examines the sources of the diversification
policy in first amendment jurisprudence and in the broadcast
industry. It concludes that precedent and reason demand that
diversification remain a policy of actively promoting an indus-
try structure in which more speakers have access to more lis-
teners, and vice versa. This note also argues that the antitrust
laws, as currently enforced, are blind to non-economic con-
cerns, and thus are an inappropriate and inadequate guardian
of the public's first amendment rights and interests. In particu-
lar, the antitrust laws' predominant concern with economic ef-
ficiency permits, and has permitted, one or a few large firms to
dominate industries, including the television broadcast indus-
try. Ownership concentration in broadcasting, even if a result
of economic efficiency, is antithetical both to the FCC's long-
standing diversification policy and to the public's right to free
and informed speech.
This note concludes that the increasingly rapid pace of tech-
nological change indicates a need for more precise and innova-
tive policies designed to promote and protect the first
amendment rights and interests of the public through further
diversification. The marketplace may be a proper "laboratory"
for FCC policy-making. This is especially true with regard to
new and untested communications technologies such as DBS; it
is true even with respect to conventional radio and television
broadcasting that have operated under regulations, such as the
Seven Station Rule, that have not worked well in the past and
are anachronistic at present. Yet, the view that the market-
place is an optimum "laboratory" cannot alone justify deregula-
tion. The FCC must delineate the ground rules for its
experimentation policies, and it must devote significantly more
energy to monitoring the industry it regulates. Finally, the
FCC should encourage through its regulatory powers active re-
search and development aimed at creating economies of small
scale distribution throughout the broadcast/video industries.
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commission from time to
time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall -
(r) Make such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and
conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this chapter.
No. 4]
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II
The Marketplace of Ideas
Justice Black, in Associated Press v. United States,se and Jus-
tice Holmes, in Abrams v. United States, l set out the touch-
stones of the Supreme Court's first amendment jurisprudence.
In Associated Press, Justice Black stated: "The First Amend-
ment ... rests on the assumption that the widest possible dis-
semination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press
is a condition of a free society. '' 32 In Abrams v. United States,
Justice Holmes stated:
[When men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market.3
The idea that the first amendment is intended to preserve a
"marketplace of ideas" in which competition will take the form
of debate has informed Supreme Court decisions on defama-
tion, 4 obscenity,3 the advocacy of violence,3 campaign spend-
ing,37 and the editorial responsibilities of broadcasters." All of
these cases acknowledge that the system of self-government es-
30. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
31. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
32. 326 U.S. at 20.
33. 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
34. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964) (holding that lia-
bility for defamation of a public official requires proof of actual malice): "Thus we
consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."
See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (holding that the New
York Times rule does not apply to defamation of private individuals).
35. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (holding that "obscenity" is not
protected speech): '"Te protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people."
36. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) (affirming convictions for
advocating the overthrow of the Government under the "clear and present danger
test"): "[Tihe basis of the First Amendment is the hypothesis that speech can rebut
speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of ideas will result in the
wisest governmental policies."
37. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (upholding limits on campaign contribu-
tions and striking down limits on campaign spending): "Discussion of public issues
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the sys-
tem of government established by our Constitution." See also Federal Election
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tablished by the Constitution requires that those who govern,
the people, be well-informed.3 As the Court said in Buckley v.
Valeo, "[i]n a republic where the people are sovereign, the abil-
ity of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates
for office is essential. '40 The first amendment is, according to
Professor Meiklejohn, not so much a "right" as a reservation of
the sovereign power of the people: "The First Amendment
does not protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the freedom
of those activities of thought and communication by which we
'govern.' It is concerned, not with a private right, but with a
public power, a governmental responsibility."''1
The Court, as a consequence, has at times referred to speech
on political issues as the "most protected" speech under the
first amendment.' At least one commentator has urged that
the first amendment should protect only political speech.43
The Court, though, has never gone this far; it has frequently
noted that, in principle, the whole gamut of literary, social, sci-
entific, artistic, and educational speech is protected." It would
seem, too, that such protection is a necessary underpinning to
the individual citizen's power and responsibility to govern well.
As Professor Meiklejohn pointed out:
(Vioting is merely the external expression of a wide and di-
verse number of activities by means of which citizens attempt
to meet the responsibilities of making judgments, which that
Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 1459
(1985) (striking down limits on campaign spending by independent groups).
38. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (upholding the
"fairness doctrine"); see ii fra notes 99-111 and accompanying text. For a detailed
discussion of the role of the "marketplace" metaphor in Supreme Court decisions, see
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 967-
73 (1978).
39. See, e.g., New York Times, 376 U.S. at 274 (quoting James Madison): "The
people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty."'
40. 424 U.S. at 14-15.
41. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 61 SuP. CT. REV. 245,254-55
(1961).
42. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 105 S. Ct. at 1467 (campaign expenditures at issue "produce speech at the core
of the First Amendment"); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (political expression deserves the
"broadest protection" under the first amendment); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bel-
lottl, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978).
43. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971).
44. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748, 762, 765 (1976) (holding that commercial speech is protected). The
protection extends, at least, to Ideas having "redeeming social value." Roth, 354 U.S.
at 484; see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390; infra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
No. 4]
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freedom to govern lays upon them. That freedom implies and
requires what we call "the dignity of the individual." Self-gov-
ernment can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelli-
gence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the
general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to
express.
45
In other words, individual "dignity" or "self-fulfillment" 46 is
not merely one of several values served by the first amend-
ment, but is the primary value from which the capacity to gov-
ern is derived.47
The focus of first amendment protection should therefore be
on the integrity of the individual who speaks and listens and
not on speech as such. In the marketplace of ideas, however,
this has not always been the case. There is an implied premise
in first amendment jurisprudence that truth is objective and
thus its existence and value readily discernible.48 The market-
place metaphor depends on a notion that thoughts and ideas are
discrete, value-laden things that can be held or discarded, com-
pared, traded and sold. One result is that the scope of protec-
tion often depends on the measurable value of a particular kind
of speech. Professor Baker has argued49 that the premise is ap-
parent in cases such as Roth v. United States in which the Court
circumscribed a discrete set of speech called "obscenity" and
determined it to be valueless,50 and in Dennis v. United States
in which the Court set up a kind of accounting system for mea-
suring the "clear and present danger" of a particular
expression. 1
In other cases, though, the Court seems to have acknowl-
edged the limits of the premise that ideas are easily circum-
45. Meiklejohn, supra note 41, at 255.
46. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 6-7 (1971), in which
he describes four values that the first amendment serves: self-fulfillment; discovery
of knowledge and truth; the ability to participate in decision-making (not exclusively
political); and achievement of an adaptable, stable society. See also Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
47. Baker, supra note 38, at 974-75, 990-91; Meiklejohn, supra note 41, at 255-56.
48. See Baker, supra note 38, at 974-76, tracing the notion that truth is objective to
J. S. Mill's On Liberty. See also Meiklejohn, supra note 41, at 263. But see Bork, supra
note 43, at 28 (assuming that, under an interpretation of the first amendment in which
only political speech is protected, political "truth" is whatever the majority deems it
to be).
49. Baker, supra note 38, at 968-73.
50. 354 U.S. at 484.
51. 341 U.S. at 510 (" 'whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by its improba-
bility, justifies the invasion of free speech.' ").
(Vol. 7
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scribed. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,52 for example, the
Court concluded that it could not fashion a rule of libel depen-
dent upon protection of political issues because it could not
readily distinguish among those ideas worthy of protection and
those that are not.53 Gertz and New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van" instead crafted rules of libel which vary depending upon
the status of the libeled party. The cases accord protection not
to the content or value of the speech itself, but to the process of
debate, on the one hand, and individual dignity on the other.5
This note assumes that, as Justice Frankfurter said, "[t]ruth
and understanding are not wares like peanuts or potatoes. ''se It
takes as a premise the belief that individual integrity and a hu-
mane intelligence are worthy goals of themselves and antece-
dent to informed governance. Therefore, this note also
assumes that the first amendment should be understood to pre-
serve the marketplace of ideas itself, and the vitality of its par-
ticipants, and not just presumptive notions of the acceptable
content of the exchange.
III
The Broadcast Marketplace
In broadcasting, economic competition and the first amend-
ment meet. Congress, the FCC, and the Supreme Court have
acknowledged that unregulated economic competition is likely
to be inconsistent with a vital marketplace of ideas. The FCC
has therefore promulgated, and the Supreme Court has rati-
fied, both content 7 and ownershipms regulations designed to
protect the public's interest in robust debate from unfettered
economic competition.
Of course, the newspaper industry has always been a central
52. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
53. Id at 337-39, 346 (rejecting the approach favored by Justice Brennan speaking
for a plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).)
54. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
55. The law of defamation" 'reflects no more than our basic concept of the essen-
tial dignity and worth of every human being - a concept at the root of any decent
system of ordered liberty.'" Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
56. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
57. Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367.
58. FC v. NCCB, 438 U.S. at 795. See also United States v. Storer Broadcasting
Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (upholding the Seven Station Rule).
No. 4]
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forum for trade in ideas; yet, the Supreme Court has struck
down laws directed at newspaper publishers similarly intended
to "enhance" public debate. 9 The long tradition of uninhibited
print journalism supports to some extent the Court's distinc-
tion between the print and broadcast media.6° Ultimately,
though, differences in the physical characteristics and attend-
ant technology of the media have justified disparate first
amendment standards. As the Court stated in Red Lion:
"Although broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First
Amendment interest... differences in the characteristics of
new media justify differences in the First Amendment stan-
dards applied to them. ' 1
A. Characteristics of the Broadcast Medium
The impetus for the Communications Act 2 (and its predeces-
sor Radio Act of 1927)6 was the need to allocate scarce frequen-
cies among more potential broadcasters than could be
accommodated.6 Uninhibited broadcasting by more than one
station owner on the same frequency had resulted in a
"cacophony of competing voices."' 5
Spectrum scarcity was not only an impetus, but also a legal
justification for the Act's broad grant of regulatory power to
the FCC. Congress chose, in effect, to nationalize the air-
waves.6 7  Broadcasters are consequently licensed as public
trustees of the publicly-owned electromagnetic spectrum.68
Since the licensee has no property right to the frequency, but is
a privileged fiduciary of its use, the public (acting through its
representatives, the FCC) may attach qualifications designed to
59. Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down a Flor-
ida "right of reply" statute applicable to newspaper publishers).
60. I& at 248-54 (considering, but finding unpersuasive, significant evidence that
the newspaper industry is no longer economically competitive or a source of robust
debate).
61. 395 U.S. at 386.
62. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-611 (West 1962 & Supp. 1984).
63. Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
64. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375-77.
65. I& at 376.
66. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376, 388-89; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190, 209-13 (1943). But see Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunica-
tions Pre DUKE L.J. 213, 226-29 (1975), for a criticism of spectrum scarcity as a legal
rationale.
67. "It is the purpose of this chapter.., to provide for the use of such channels,
but not the ownership thereof .... " 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
68. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376-77.
[Vol. 7
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protect the public interest.69
The "pervasiveness" of the medium is a related, but nonethe-
less distinct, aspect of broadcasting's unique character. Perva-
siveness refers to the potential range and intrusiveness of radio
and television broadcasts.70 It is a product of the inherent phys-
ical characteristics of radio waves.7 Because of radio's perva-
siveness, and the ensuing overlap and chaos created by
unmanaged delivery, spectrum space had to be allocated as a
ministerial matter.72 Further, the potential geographic range
and psychological impact of radio broadcasts directed at a cap-
tive audience led legislators to fear the broadcasters' influential
power.73
When Congress realized that a relative few could have access
to the airwaves, it feared that the channels would become con-
centrated into even fewer, monied hands.74 The broadcasting
industry was, from the start, prone to excessive concentration.
The early leaders in radio broadcasting were RCA, General
Electric and Westinghouse. 75 Through a system of cross-licens-
ing, they controlled the manufacture of radio apparatus and be-
came known as the "radio trust."76 They quickly recognized,
too, the economic advantages of tying individual stations to-
69. I& See also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. at 215-16;
Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9, at 226-27.
70. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1979).
71. Pac(fica, 438 U.S. at 748.
72. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387-88.
73. National As'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
In recent years, the pervasiveness of radio and television broadcasts in terms of
their psychological impact on audiences, particularly children, has received a great
deal of attention. In FCC v. Pacifia Foundation, the Supreme Court cited the "per-
vasiveness" of the broadcast medium as sufficient justification for the FCC's power to
ban indecent (but not obscene) language from the airwaves. 438 U.S. at 748. The
Court noted that broadcasts intrude into the privacy of the home, that they reach a
captive audience unable to predetermine the content each time the receiver is turned
on, and that "broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children." Id at 748-49. The
FCC's inquiries into the effects of television programming and advertising on children
also acknowledge the "impact" problem. Children's Television Report and Policy
Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974), qffd, Action for Children's Television, 564 F.2d 458
(D.C. Cir. 1977). Yet the concern is not Just directed at children. The ban on cigarette
advertising, Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), attests to a concern for all
viewers. The Department of Justice, as well, has cited the greater impact of TV, as
opposed to radio, advertising as a reason for regarding TV and radio advertising as
separate product markets. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at para 67.
74. See infra notes 107-23 and accompanying text.
75. B. ComAIn, WHO OWNS THE MEwz.? 80 (1979).
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gether through chain broadcasting arrangements. 7  Thus,
"Congress moved under the spur of a widespread fear that in
the absence of governmental control the public interest might
be subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcasting
field.,17
B. The Public Convenience, Interest and Necessity
Congressional recognition of the unique characteristics of the
broadcast medium compelled delegation to the FCC of the au-
thority to regulate "in the public convenience, interest, or ne-
cessity."'79 The FCC's authority includes both the power and
the duty to regulate in the public interest. The enabling word
in section 303 of the Act is "shall. ' 'se Therefore, while the Com-
mission may have discretion to define the "public interest" in
any particular circumstance,8 ' and may choose the means to ad-
vance that interest, 2 it does not have discretion to ignore a rel-
evant public interest or depart from prior conclusions about the
public interest without reason."
The use made of the broadcasting medium directly affects
the public's interest in free speech. The Supreme Court has
said that t~ie public interest standard "necessarily invites refer-
ence to First Amendment principles."84 The Court set out
those principles in Red Lion:
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an unin-
hibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that
market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private
licensee .... It is the right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences which is crucial here.s
The Court does not use "monopolization" here in the narrow
sense of a single firm's economic control over an entire market,
but in the broader sense of any control in excess of relative par-
77. l Initially, RCA, GE, and Westinghouse jointly owned NBC's two radio
networks.
78. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1939).
79. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375-77; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. at 209-13.
80. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1985).
81. 1FC v. NCCB, 436 U.S. at 793.
82. Id at 793-96.
83. Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
84. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122 (1973).
85. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (emphasis added).
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ity with other participants in the industry. After all, in Red
Lion the Court upheld the fairness doctrine, which prohibits a
broadcaster's complete "monopoly" control over even the con-
tent of her own broadcasts. The public has a right to receive
access to virtually all ideas and experiences. The public inter-
est, therefore, cannot countenance anything but a broadcasting
system comprised of numerous, equally powerful speakers, un-
less one contends that any single speaker can convey ade-
quately all ideas and experiences. Of course, the first
amendment is based on the knowledge that the latter conten-
tion is contrary to human nature. Self-interest will always
skew the choice and manner of speech. The FCC, as a result, is
under an affirmative duty to diffuse the impact that the self-
interest of broadcasters might have on the quality of public
learning and debate.
IV
Diversification
A. The Rationale Behind Ownership Regulations
The primary purpose of the FCC's ownership rules is to limit
the power that the relatively few owners of broadcast outlets
have to control the process of debatem The fear that an indi-
vidual broadcaster might exert too much influence over her au-
dience is a product of the technology that permits that
broadcaster to amplify and extend her voice into hundreds of
thousands of homes.8 7 It is the technology of broadcasting that
has justified the constitutional standard which gives priority to
the first amendment rights of the listeners, rather than the
speakers s The FCC's ownership rules have been intended, in
effect, to equalize the relative positions of speakers and listen-
ers.s9 By limiting owners to a single outlet in any one city, °
and by restraining the reach of group-owned stations,9 1 the
FCC has attempted to diffuse the impact that any one voice
might have on its captive audience. For instance, as the Com-
86. See supra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
87. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386-88.
88. Id. at 387. "The right of free speech of a broadcaster. . . or any other individ-
ual does not embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others." ILd.
89. 1& at 387-88.
90. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)-(c) (1984). See supra notes 2.3.
91. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1984). See aupra note 4.
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mission said in the Newspaper/TV Order,92 in which the FCC
banned future co-ownership of a newspaper and television sta-
tion in the same local market: "'his is a vitally important mat-
ter, for it is essential to a democracy that its electorate be
informed and have access to divergent viewpoints on controver-
sial issues."'93
Content regulations such as section 31594 and the fairness
doctrine95 derive from the same first amendment policy favor-
.ing diversification of available viewpoints.9 The advantage to
structural regulations-rules designed to control the ownership
structure in the market-is that diversification can be pro-
moted without direct interference into speech itself." As the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals noted with regard to the
newspaper/TV co-ownership ban:
In any event, the Constitutional difficulties with promoting
diversity through speech restrictive means highlight the virtue
of the prospective cross-ownership rules. The prospective ban
is an attempt to promote diversity without government regula-
tion of or supervision over speech. The rules attempt to pro-
mote vigorous public debate not by imposing restrictions on
broadcasts, but simply by permitting more to be heard.s
Content regulations involve the government in decisions as
to what shall be said. 9 Although the Supreme Court upheld
the fairness doctrine, it did so in part because the broadcasters
had not shown much resistance to its strictures and so had of-
fered few opportunities for actual government interference.x°°
The Court has also observed in Columbia Broadcasting System
v. Democratic National Committee that the FCC has given
broadcasters wide discretion as to how to comply with the doc-
trine.'l ' But in that case the Court refused to take the logic of
Red Lion one step further. It held that the first amendment
92. 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975).
93. Id. at para. 99.
94. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982).
95. See Red Lion, 396 U.S. at 377-78.
96. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 950 (D.C. Cir.
1977), affd in par4 revd in part, FCC v. NCCB, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
97. Id See also Bazelon, supra note 66, at 238.
98. NCCB v. FMX, 555 F.2d at 950.
99. See, e.g., Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 254: "[]mplementation of... an enforce-
able right of access necessarily calls for some mechanism, either governmental or con-
sensual. If it is governmental coercion, this at once brings about a confrontation with
the express provisions of the First Amendment."
100. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 392-93.
101. 412 U.S. at 118.
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did not require broadcasters to sell time to individuals wishing
to make political statements. 0 2 The Court in particular feared
the constant governmental supervision that a "right-of-access"
would require.'3 The Court has accepted the fairness doctrine,
then, because in practice it has involved a very limited and be-
nign FCC oversight of broadcast content.
The threshold difficulty with any content regulation, even if
actual enforcement is benign, is deciding initially what content
to regulate. The FCC, despite the Court's imprimatur on "the
right of the public to receive suitable access to social, politca4
esthetic, mora4 and other ideas and experiences,' '1o4 has fo-
cused its attention on the free flow of political ideas and issues
of public controversy, rather than on the entire range of
speech, artistic, social, or otherwise, that might be broadcast.
Section 3 1 5,1os the "equal time" provision for federal political
candidates, is one example of the priority given to "political
speech." The fairness doctrine, which requires a balance in the
presentation only of issues of public controversy,' °e is another.
The comparative hearing process,10 as well, requires the FCC
to weigh only the respective stations' non-entertainment for-
mats in deciding which one .will better serve the public
interest.1°s
Yet the FCC has encountered the same problem with catego-
rizing speech that the Supreme Court avoided in Gertz:1°9
where does one draw the line between controversial political
speech and non-controversial non-political speech? The Com-
mission found itself compelled at one point to hold that the
fairness doctrine required stations to air anti-cigarette state-
ments on the ground that cigarette commercials implicitly as-
serted that smoking was healthy."0 The decision haunted the
FCC later as more groups urged the application of the fairness
102. Id. at 126-32.
103. Id at 126-27.
104. 395 U.S. at 390 (emphasis added).
105. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982).
106. 395 U.S. at 375-79.
107. At a comparative hearing, the FCC chooses from among competing applicants
for a broadcast license the one "who will provide the 'best practicable service to the
public."' Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d at 1207.
108. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
109. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
110. In re WCBS, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, qffd on rehearing, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), affd sub
nor. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
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doctrine to a variety of commercial advertisements."' Ulti-
mately, however, no matter what stance the FCC takes, any ef-
fort to control the content of broadcast speech will distort the
debate that would otherwise take place.11
B. Congressional Mandate
The Communications Act of 1934113 itself does not contain
explicit provisions aimed at excessive ownership concentration.
Congress understood, however, that the antitrust laws might
not reach the kind of monopoly power that could choke free
speech through control of the air waves. The Communications
Act, for instance, grants the FCC the authority to promulgate
regulations restricting chain broadcasting." 4 Section 314 spe-
cifically prohibits radio companies from acquiring or control-
ling telegraph or telephone companies, or vice versa, if "the
effect thereof may be to substantially lessen competition or to
restrain commerce. 11 5 Section 313(a) extends the antitrust
laws to the manufacture and trade in "radio apparatus and de-
vices," and empowers the courts to revoke the license of an an-
titrust violator in addition to any other penalties."86 Section
313(b) similarly requires the FCC to refuse a new license to any
antitrust violator whose license previously has been revoked." 7
Together, these sections express Congressional intent that the
FCC itself take the necessary steps to prevent excessive owner-
ship concentration in the broadcast industry.
Congress, when it debated and passed the Communications
111. See Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on
Fairness and Access, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768, 775-77 (1972).
112. The FCC is coming around to this view. In WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC,
450 U.S. 582 (1981), the Court affirmed the FCC's conclusion that selection of radio
station entertainment formats should be left to market forces. Recently, the FCC
conducted public hearings into whether the Commission should repeal the fairness
doctrine. It is no secret that the Commission Chairman, Mark Fowler, favors repeal.
See Fowler and Brenner, supra note 9. The Commission finally, and reluctantly, de-
cided to retain the fairness doctrine. See supra note 16.
113. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-611 (West 1962 & Supp. 1984).
114. 47 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1982). The television networks are "chain broadcasting"
arrangements. The Supreme Court upheld the FCC's power to regulate chain broad-
casting in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
115. 47 U.S.C. § 314 (1982). This section echoes both the anti-merger language of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982) and the restraint of trade proscriptions of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The section therefore appears to be redundant.
116. 47 U.S.C. § 313(a) (1982). This section is also largely redundant since the anti.
trust laws do not contain an exception for radio manufacturers.
117. 47 U.S.C. § 313(b) (1982).
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Act in 1934, must have been aware of the legislative history of
the Sherman Act.l l" The Sherman Act has been subjected to
varying critical interpretations,11 9 but it is commonly under-
stood that the it is primarily intended to attack economic inef-
fiency.12m The Sherman Act was not intended to apply to
monopolies gained solely through superior efficiency, skill and
business acumen. 2 1 The courts, moreover, have accepted and
applied this interpretation.' By 1934, technological acumen
had already given companies like RCA and Westinghouse a
head start in the broadcasting field.123 Thus, Congress had
cause to be concerned that a few giants might dominate broad-
casting, despite the antitrust laws, if the FCC did not retain the
authority to protect opportunities for the dissemination of va-
ried opinions on public issues. As one Congressman said
earlier:
There is no agency so fraught with possibilities for service of
good or evil to the American people as the radio. As a means
of entertainment, education, information and communication
it has limitless possibilities. The power of the press will not be
comparable to that of broadcasting stations when the industry
is fully developed. If the development continues as rapidly in
the future as in the past, it will only be a few years before these
broadcasting stations, if operated by chain stations, will simul-
taneously reach an audience of over half of our entire citizen-
ship, and bring messages to the fireside of nearly every home
in America. They can mold and crystallize sentiment as no
agency in the past has been able to do. If the strong arm of the
law does not prevent monopoly ownership and make discrimi-
nation by such stations illegal, American thought and Ameri-
118. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
119. See Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Anti.
trust The Fffiienwy Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982); Pitofsky,
The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979); Bork, Legislative
Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 (1966).
120. See intfra notes 262-80 and accompanying text.
121. Bork, supra note 119, at 29-30; Pitofsky, supra note 119, at 1057.
122. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 390
(1956); California Computer Prods. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1979). But see
R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 164-72 (1978) (observing that the courts have not
consistently applied this interpretation).
123. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. Congressmen debating the Ra-
dio Act of 1927 were aware that the Federal Trade Commission had filed suit in 1924
against the radio manufacturers for antitrust violations. As of 1926 the suit was still
pending and skepticism was expressed as to whether the suit would successfully re-
strain the manufacturers' powers, at least in any reasonable time period. 67 CoNG.
REC. 5478, 5481 (1926) (statement of Rep. Davis).
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can politics will be largely at the mercy of those who operate
these stations. For publicity is the most powerful weapon that
can be wielded in a Republic, and when such a weapon is
placed in the hands of one, or a single selfish group is permit-
ted to either tacitly or otherwise acquire ownership and domi-
nate these broadcasting stations throughout the country, then
woe be to those who dare to differ with them. It will be impos-
sible to compete with them in reaching the ears of the Ameri-
can people.124
The problem was, and is, that economic inefficiency is not the
only adverse consequence of monopolization of the broadcast-
ing industry. Whether a monopoly is attained through conspir-
acy l z5 through predatory acts in furtherance of monopoly
power,1w through unfair business practices,' or through inno-
cent skill,I 2 Congress and the public cannot countenance a pri-
vate stranglehold on the communications channels.'
C. The Ownership Rules
1. Rulemaking Authority
Congress gave the FCC jurisdiction over "a field of enterprise
the dominant character of which was the rapid pace of its un-
folding."' s The FCC enacted blanket ownership rules in order
to check accretions of economic and editorial power on the as-
sumption that ad hoc regulation could not adequately monitor
and control the pace of change.' 3 ' In its order prohibiting own-
ership of more than one broadcast license of any kind in a local
market, the Commission stated that its enabling policy was di-
versification. 32 It stated further:
[Ihe governing consideration here is power, and power can be
124. 67 CONG. REc. 5557, 5558 (1926) (statement of Rep. Johnson).
125. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (prohibiting "[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce").
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (punishing "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce").
127. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982) (declaring unlawful any unfair methods of competi-
tion or any unfair or deceptive practices in or affecting commerce).
128. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
129. Newspaper/TV Order, supra note 7, at para. 14: "The significance of owner-
ship from the standpoint of 'the widest possible dissemination of information' lies in
the fact that ownership carries with it the power to select, to edit, and to choose the
methods, manner and emphasis of presentation .... "
130. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. at 219.
131. NCCB v. FC, 555 F.2d at 944.
132. Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 22
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realistically tempered on a structural basis. It is therefore no
answer to the problem to insist upon a finding of some im-
proper conduct or practice. The effects of joint ownership are
likely in any event to be so intangible as not to be susceptible
of precise definition. The law is clear that specific findings of
improper harmful conduct are not a necessary element in
Commission action in this area, and that remedial action need
not await the feared result."
2. Local Ownership Rules
Most of the multiple ownership rules are designed to diver-
sify the ownership of stations in each local market. The Com-
mission, in separate orders between 1940 and 1943, prohibited
ownership of more than one license in the same broadcast ser-
vice in the same local market (the "duopoly" rule).'l 4 The
Commission amended the latter rules in 1964 to define explic-
itly the service area in which such ownership combinations
would be prohibited.135 In 1970, the Commission decided to
deny any license to the owner of any other broadcast service
within the same market (the "one-to-a-market" rule).13 At the
same time, the Commission initiated an inquiry into ownership
of both a newspaper and broadcast license in the same mar-
ket.137 The inquiry resulted in the Newspaper/TV Order ban-
ning, prospectively, common ownership of a newspaper and
broadcast station in the same market.1'3 Subsequently, the
F.C.C.2d 306, para. 16 (1970) (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945), and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
133. Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 22
F.C.C.2d at para. 20. The law is clear that the FCC has the authority to promulgate
broad structural regulations. See FCCv. NCCB, 436 U.S. at 796-97 (" '[d]iversity and its
effects are... elusive concepts, not easily defined let alone measured without mak-
ing qualitative judgments objectionable on both policy and First Amendment
grounds.' "); see also United States v. Storer Broadcasting, 351 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1956).
134. See Multiple Ownership of Standard Broadcast Stations (AM radio), 8 Fed.
Reg. 16,065 (1943); Rules and Regulations Governing Commercial Television Broad-
cast Stations, 6 Fed. Reg. 2284, 2284-85 (1941); Rules Governing Standard and High
Frequency Broadcast Stations (FM radio), 5 Fed. Reg. 2382 (1940).
135. Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 45
F.C.C. 1476 (1964) (defining the service area of a station by the reach of its signal at a
stated power output).
136. Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 22
F.C.C.2d 306 (1970), as modifed, 28 F.C.C.2d 662 (1971) (codified at 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.3555(b)) (the modification vacated the rule's application to AM-FM and UHF-
radio combinations).
137. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Docket No. 18110), 22 F.C.C.2d 339
(1970).
138. Newspaper/TV Order, supra note 7, at 102.
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FCC also banned local cable television/broadcast television
combinations.13
The local ownership rules are a part of the FCC's broader
"localism" policy. Under this policy, the FCC has attempted to
license stations to individual owners who would serve the needs
and desires of the local community. 14 The ownership rules en-
sure that many local broadcast voices will be in place to re-
spond to local issues and interests, and that the influential
impact that any one voice might have on the local audience will
be diffused."
3. The Seven Station Rule
The FCC promulgated the Seven Station Rule in 1953.11
The rule prohibited a single person from holding a cognizable
interest in more than seven AM, seven FM, and five television
stations." 3 The Commission at that time declined to make any
distinction between VHF and UHF stations.'" Later the Com-
mission amended the rule to permit ownership of a total of
seven television stations if no more than five were VHF sta-
tions.145 In announcing its decision to set overall ownership
limits, the Commission said:
Simply stated, the fundamental purpose of this facet of the
miltiple ownership rules is to promote diversification of own-
ership in order to maximize diversification of program and ser-
vice viewpoints as well as to prevent any undue concentration
of economic power contrary to the public interest. In this con-
nection, we wish to emphasize that by such rules diversifica-
tion of program services is furthered without any
139. Second Report and Order in Docket No. 18,397, 23 F.C.C.2d 816 (1970) (codi-
fied at 47 C.F.R. § 76.501 (1984)).
140. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at paras. 6, 10, 34-43. For example, until
recent deregulation, radio and television operators were required to follow formal
procedures for "ascertaining" the broadcasting needs and interests of the local com-
munity. See Deregulation of Television, supra note 9, at paras. 45-54; Deregulation of
Radio, supra note 9, at paras. 55-72. f. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740
F.2d at 1197-98 (holding that the Communications Act does not require purely local
service to the exclusion of technologies such as DBS).
141. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at paras. 8, 31-43.
142. Amendment of sections 3.35, 3.240 and 3.636 of the Rules and Regulations Re-
lating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Report
and Order, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953), affd sub nom United States v. Storer Broadcasting
Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Ownership Report and Order].
143. Id, at paras. 16-18.
144. Id, at para. 15.
145. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1984).
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governmental encroachment on what we recognize to be the
prime responsibility of the broadcast licensee.'"
In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,1 47 the Supreme
Court upheld the Commission's authority to create the multi-
ple ownership limits. The Court pointed out that the Commis-
sion had broad rulemaking authority under section 154(i)'" and
under section 303(r) 149 to protect the public interest.150 More-
over, the Court said, "lilts authority covers new and rapidly de-
veloping fields.' 15 1 The FCC, it said, was not limited to making
ad hoc decisions after notice and a full hearing in each case.152
The Court noted further that Congress specifically intended
that the Commission would "assure fair opportunity for open
competition in the use of broadcasting facilities.... We think
the Multiple Ownership Rules, as adopted, are reconcilable
with the Communications Act as a whole."'
D. Competing Interests and Necessities
The FCC nonetheless has been forced to accommodate com-
peting concerns. Its charter unambiguously empowers the
Commission to promote industry expansion and progress.1m
The Supreme Court has acknowledged, too, that the Commis-
sion's "other, and sometimes conflicting, goal has been to en-
sure 'the best practicable service to the public.' "1'5
Diversification has therefore been given low priority at times in
order to encourage journalistic expertise, to allow firms to take
advantage of efficient business arrangements, and to avoid dis-
ruption of service.
1. Promoting Journalistic Expertise
In the early years of radio and TV development, the Commis-
sion did not discourage,'5 and sometimes actively promoted, lo-
cal newspaper and TV or radio combinations. 5 7 Initially, it was
146. Ownership Report and Order, supra note 142, at para. 10.
147. 351 U.S. 192.
148. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1982).
149. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1982).
150. 351 U.S. at 203.
151. Id.
152. Id at 202-03.
153. Id at 203-04.
154. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1982).
155. FW . NCCB, 436 U.S. at 782.
156. Newspaper/TV Order, supra note 7, at paras. 62-63.
157. See Note, Diveraiftcation and the Public Interest Administrative Responsi-
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felt that radio and television were not sources of serious jour-
nalism.Im Newspaper publishers offered journalistic expertise
and the necessary capital to absorb losses during broadcasting's
infancy.59 In the Newspaper/TV Order, however, the Commis-
sion determined that broadcasting had "matured" and that the
need to cross-fertilize broadcasting operations with a pub-
lisher's expertise was "no longer generally operative. ''le °
2. Industry Stability
The FCC may consider diversification along with other fac-
tors in choosing between competing license applicants.""
Nonetheless, the FCC has routinely granted new licenses to ex-
perienced broadcasters, despite the increase in concentration
that results, rather than license unaffiliated and untested appli-
cants.6 2 On renewal application, an unaffiliated applicant has
rarely displaced a more concentrated licensee.las In 1970, more-
over, the Commission adopted a comparative hearing policy
statement that would have removed diversification as a crite-
rion for judging license candidates.'" The new policy gave
highest priority to "the value of not undermining predictability
and stability of broadcast operation."'" The District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals struck down the 1970 policy statement in
Citizens Communications Center v. FCC.l Since that time,
the Commission has adopted a "policy of refusing to consider
questions of concentration of control unless specific abuses are
shown .... [A]bsent a showing of economic monopolization
that might warrant actions under the Sherman Act, it would
not be our view that such arguments would raise valid is-
bility of the FC, 66 YALE L.J. 365, 372 n.39 (1957) (noting the strong Congressional
support for newspaper ownership); Newspaper/TV Order, supra note 7, at para. 100:
"While there can be no doubt that newspaper brought a pioneering spirit to broadcast-
ing ... the special reason for encouraging newspaper ownership, even at the cost of
lessened diversity, is no longer generally operative in the way it was."
158. Bazelon, supra note 66, at 219-20.
159. Newspaper/TV Order, supra note 7, at para. 100.
160. Id.
161. McClatchey Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert denied,
353 U.S. 918 (1957) (denying a license to a newspaper and broadcast station owner in
favor of an unaffiliated applicant).
162. Note, supra note 157, at 376-79.
163. Id. at 379-80.
164. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Re-
newal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970).
165. Id. at para. 126.
166. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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sues.' 1 7 The District of Columbia Circuit has approved this ap-
proach.1 6s In the comparative hearing context, then, industry
stability takes priority over diversification. To the extent that
diversification of ownership is a factor at all, "diversification"
has been equated with the kind of economic competition which
the antitrust laws are designed to protect.
Industry stability has also been a factor in the ownership
rulemaking proceedings. When the FCC adopted the one-to-a-
market rule in 1970, it decided not to require divestiture of ex-
isting combinations.169 The Commission reaffirmed this view in
the Newspaper/TV Order, finding that "stability and continuity
of ownership do serve important public purposes."170 On
appeal, the Supreme Court vindicated the FCC's authority to
give priority to industry stability in refusing to require
divestiture.i
3. Economies of Scale
The FCC has recognized and accepted the idea that promot-
ing the economic progress of the industry requires that it allow
firms to tap economies of scale.172 The three networks have
thrived by taking maximum advantage of economies of large-
scale distibution offered by chain broadcasting arrangements. 7 3
Network affiliation allows local broadcast stations to acquire
programming without having to pay the entire cost of produc-
tion.174 Program producers, on the other hand, can distribute
their programs nationally and pay only the one transaction cost
of a sale to a network. 75 Advertisers also need not deal directly
with every individual outlet in which they desire to place a pro-
motion.76 Thus, the networks command a position of maxi-
167. Newspaper/TV Order, supra note 7, at paras. 129-30.
168. Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
169. 22 F.C.C.2d at para. 14.
170. Newspaper/TV Order, supra note 7, at paras. 30, 109.
171. FC v. NCCB, 436 U.S. at 805. See also Cable Television Systems and Post-
ponement of Divestiture Requirement, Final Rule, 49 Fed. Reg. 23348 (June 6, 1984)
(grandfathering all existing non-egregious cable/broadcast television ownership
combinations).
172. Twelve Station Order, upra note 21, at para. 82.
173. See generally B. OWEN, J. BEEBE & W. MANNING, TELEVISION ECONOMICS 18-
20 (1974); B. COMPAINE, WHO OWNs THE MEDIA? 110-13 (1979).
174. B. OwE, J. BEEBE & W. MANNING, upra note 173, at 17-20.
175. I See also B. COMPAINE, supra note 173, at 110-13.
176. B. COMPAIN,8 upra note 173, at 11L
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mum economic leverage in the broadcasting industry.177
Ironically, network chain distribution has been a necessary
economic consequence of the FCC's "localism" policy. 78 It is
economically impractical for each station owner to produce all
of her programming.179 Because broadcast station owners, due
to the localism policy and the local ownership rules, can serve
only a part of a small isolated market, they are forced to gain
access to economies of scale through network affiliation con-
tracts. Network affiliation serves as a source of cheap en-
tertainment and news programming through which to sell
advertising.180
The fact that only three networks dominate the broadcast
marketplace may be due to the FCC's aggressive efforts to ex-
pand the broadcasting industry.'' The FCC, until 1948, allo-
cated only VHF stations and gave these to the larger and more
experienced broadcasters. 18 2 Between 1948 and 1952, the Com-
mission granted no new television licenses."s When, in 1952,
the FCC resumed licensing of both VHF and UHF stations,
UHF entered the market at a distinct disadvantage.'l 4 First,
UHF is an inherently weaker, narrower-range signal l s5 Sec-
ond, most of the television sets that had been sold before 1952
received only VHF signals. 8 There was little economic incen-
tive for the existing networks to affiliate with UHF stations, or
for new networks to form around them.8 7 And it was in 1953
that the Commission adopted the Seven Station Rule. While
the Rule may have halted any further accretion of network
177. See generally id. at 102-13; see also United States v. National Broadcasting Co.,
449 F. Supp. 1127, 1129-30 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (noting the great advantage in bargaining
power that the networks hold over program suppliers), off'd mem., 603 F.2d 227 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert denied sub nom CBS, Inc. v. United States, 444 U.S. 991 (1979).
178. B. COMPAINE, supra note 173, at 13.
179. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
180. Local network affiliates retransmit, or "clear," over 90% of the programming
offered by the networks. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at para. 71.
181. B. COMPAINE, supra note 173, at 13; Note, supra note 157, at 391-94. See supra
notes 154-71 and accompanying text.
182. Note, supra note 157, at 391.
183. 1L
184. Id at 392.
185. Id.
186. Id. The concern has arisen again in the context of DBS. Opponents of the
FCC's loose regulatory policy argued that the original licensees, Satellite Television
Corporation In particular, would set defacto technical standards for the industry. The
FCC rejected these arguments. See DBS Order, supra note 18.
187. Note, supra note 157, at 392.
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power, it appears that the Rule, in combination with the disen-
franchisement of UHF stations, also helped to bar the develop-
ment of new, competing networks.Iss The FCC's aggressive
promotion decisions thus locked in three overpowering voices
on the nation's airwaves.' s9
The FCC has approached diversification through ownership
rules by means of broad prophylactic measures. Though lo-
cally-oriented broadcasting was intended to create a multitude
of relatively co-equal voices, it set the stage for network control
over advertising revenues and programming selection. As the
fare offered by the three networks attests, networking tends to
absorb whatever diversity of local voice might exist into a sin-
gle national voice."9 At the same time, policies designed to aid
the economic growth of the industry often took priority over
first amendment diversification concerns.191 The FCC today
continues to give higher priority to economic growth than it
does to diversification. The FCC has already deleted diversifi-
cation as a criterion from contested license renewal hearings.9 2
Diversification also does not completely control the ownership
rulemaking process. 93 The recent efforts to deregulate owner-
ship may remove diversification completely from the FCC's
definition of the public interest.
E. Deregulation
1. The Twelve Station Order
After publishing a Notice of Proposed Rule Making,1' 4 and
having received comments and held hearings, the Commission
decided in August 1984 to amend the Seven Station Rule.1
The decision represented one of the most radical efforts to date
by the FCC to deregulate the broadcasting industry. As
amended, the ceiling on multiple ownership of AM, FM, and
188. See inifra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
189. The FCC did later raise the TV ownership limit to 7 stations, if 2 were UHF.
47 CY..R. § 73.3555(d) (1984). In the recent Twelve Station Order, though, it was only
on reconsideration under intense Congressional pressure that the FCC accommodated
UHF's inherent disadvantage. See infra notes 237-47 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 154-71, 181-89 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
193. See upra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
194 Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73240, and 73.636 of the Commision's Rules
Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Notice
of Proposed Rule Making, 95 F.C.C.2d 360 (1983).
195. Twelve Station Order, upra note 21.
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TV stations was to be raised to twelve in each category.'" More
significant, however, was the added "sunset" provision: in six
years, 1990, all limits were to be removed. 19
Chairman Mark Fowler, speaking for the Commission, ar-
gued that the transformation of the broadcasting and video
communications industries over the past three decades had
eliminated any need for blanket limits.'x s Diversification re-
mained a vital policy, he said; changed circumstances, though,
had made moot the need for broad presumptive restrictions.'"
First, the FCC said, spectrum space is no longer a scarce com-
modity.m It pointed out that the number of radio stations had
tripled to over 9,000 outlets in the years since the Seven Station
Rule was adopted.201 Six times as many television stations, al-
most 1,200, were now broadcasting.2° 2 In the last decade alone
the expansion of cable TV to over 6,400 systems reaching al-
most two-thirds of the nation's households indicated to the
FCC that the scarcity argument was moot. 3 According to the
Commission, new technologies such as MDS, LPTV, DBS and
video cassette recorders, warranted a finding that the broadcast
market was competitive enough not to require stringent owner-
ship limits.204
Second, the FCC insisted that any pervasive influence of the
broadcast media had been diffused by the "multitudinous alter-
native outlets for the expression of ideas and the diversity of
conflicting opinions and ideas among broadcast outlets them-
selves." 5 The opinion noted as well the FCC's skepticism that
pervasiveness alone as a ground for a different first amend-
ment regime could withstand constitutional scrutiny.2°
Third, the Commission emphasized its belief that the rele-
196. I& at para. 5.
197. 1d
198. I& at para. 4.
199. 1& at paras. 4-5.
200. Id, at para. 7.
201. I& at para. 4.
202. 1d.
203. Id
204. Id. at paras. 4, 30.
205. 1& at para. 8.
206. I. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975) and First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1977)). See also Bazelon, supra note 66, at 221-22. No different first
amendment regime is necessary to justify structural, as opposed to content regula-
tions. Pervasiveness nonetheless remains an inherent attribute of the medium.
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vant market for diversity concerns is the local one.' It is the
local supply of TV and radio broadcasts, newspapers,
magazines, movies, etc., to which consumers look for informa-
tion and entertainment.2m Since the local ownership rules-
the duopoly" and one-to-a-market rules21 --will remain in
place, 11 the Commission said, any increase in concentration na-
tionally will not affect the diversity of local supply.21 2
Finally, the Commission devoted attention to its findings on
"The Effect of Group Ownership on Viewpoint Quality."21
The FCC relied primarily upon studies submitted by the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters (NAB) for its finding that
group ownership of stations is beneficial.214 The studies showed
that group owners devote more time and money to independent
news programming and public affairs programs than do in-
dependent owners. 15 Moreover, there was no evidence that
the networks imposed a "monolithic" editorial viewpoint upon
their owned and operated stations.216
The networks and the smaller group owners supported the
amendment. Metromedia Inc. agreed that the ownership limits
had perversely discouraged the appearance of strong independ-
ent voices.17 It pointed out that the ownership limits had effec-
tively prevented alternative groups from establishing a base of
outlets with which to garner national advertising funds.218 It
noted that removal of the limits would allow new networks,
and ad hoc networks, to form around owned and operated sta-
tions reaching a significant share of the nation's households.219
Metromedia argued, and the FCC agreed, that only by permit-
ting larger station groups to form would owners be able to tap
sufficient economies of scale, i.e., more efficient distribution
207. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at para. 32.
208. Id
209. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a) (1984).
210. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (1984).
211. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at paras. 32, 43.
212. Id. at paras. 31-43. See supra notes 140-41,178-80 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the FCC's 'localism" policy.
213. Twelve Station Order, aupra note 21, at paras. 44-59.
214. Id at pars. 45. The NAB is an industry trade association formed to protect
and promote broadcast interests. See Note, A Tale of Two Standard: Antitru the
Public Interest and the Television Industry, 6 CoMM/ENT LJ. 887, 889 (1984).
215. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at paras. 45-50.
216. Id at para. 52.
217. I& at paras. 57-58 (citing Comments of Metromedia, Inc. at 25-27).
218. I&
219. 1&
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schemes and organizational structures to be able to devote re-
sources to independent news and entertainment
programming.=o
The DOJ submitted its study of the effects of the rule change
on competition. The DOJ defined the product markets as the
markets for television and radio advertising.2 21 The DOJ con-
cluded that since the networks already dominate the national
advertising market and since affiliates "clear" over 90% of net-
work programming, even if the networks were to buy their af-
filiates, there would be no less competition at the national
level.m And if smaller group owners in fact increase their
shares, the rule change would increase competition on the na-
tional level.2 s As for local advertising, the Department ob-
served that revenues come from local sources.22 ' Since the
amendment does not affect local concentration, it will have no
effect on local competition.2 As an additional finding, DOJ
measured the level of economic concentration in the broadcast-
ing industry. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the televi-
sion industry, based on revenues, was 229.m When calculated
according to audience share, the Index yielded a value of 115.227
The threshold level raising antitrust concerns is 1000.M
The FCC concluded that the potential efficiency gains from
new and larger networks were worth pursuingm Economies
of scale created by ownership access to a greater number of out-
lets, it said, are likely to support new independent news-gath-
220. I& at paras. 57-58, 82. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
221. IdE at pars. 67. The distinction was based on the perceived greater impact of
television advertising on audiences.
222. 1d. at para. 71.
223. Id.
224. I,
225. I&
226. I& at para. 74. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure of the
relative economic concentration in an industry. It is calculated by adding the squares
of the market share percentages of the individual participants. 1800 is considered
highly concentrated. See generally H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST LAw 302-03 (1985).
227. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at para. 74. CBS calculated the audience
share HHI. The calculation underscores the difficulty of applying standard antitrust
measures to the broadcasting industry. CBS's calculation was based on owned sta-
tions and found that no single owner's share exceeded 3.8%. But through affiliation
contracts, the three networks routinely garner 17-18% each of the prime-time audi-
ence. The HHI for such a measure would exceed 800 for the networks alone, and over
1000 for the entire industry.
228. H. HovENKAMP, supra note 226, at 302.03.
229. Twelve Station Order, upra note 21, at para. 82.
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ering services and public affairs programming. ° Those with
superior skills should be encouraged to apply them to more sta-
tions, 2 l And even larger networks might tap as yet undis-
cerned economies of scale. 2s2 In any event, the FCC reasoned,
the accuracy of their predictions should be tested.2s The FCC
saw no reason to distinguish the three major networks from
other group owners under the terms of the rulemaking pro-
ceeding.234 Finally, the FCC promised to scrutinize individual
transactions s.2 - The Commission summarized the policy behind
the amendment to the Seven Station Rule in the following
statement:
The Supreme Court has instructed that the public interest
standard that governs the Commission's policies invited refer-
ence to First Amendment principles .... A cherished First
Amendment principle crowns speech that addresses political
or public affairs with maximum constitutional protection be-
cause of its centrality to efficacious democratic govern-
ment.... The record in this proceeding demonstrates that
network and group owners offer the electorate more. Accord-
ingly, fidelity to First Amendment values and the public inter-
est counsels the Commission against rules or policies that
could artificially restrict group ownership."s
Congress immediately raised a hue and cry.2s It slapped a
moratorium on implementation of the new Twelve Station
Rule2ss and the FCC was forced to reconsider. After collecting
additional comments, the FCC changed its position and
230. Id.
231. Id
232. Ii
233. I& at para- 86.
234. Id. at paras. 97-107. The DOJ regards network ownership of stations as a form
of vertical integration. Id. at para. 97. The DOJ in general favors vertical mergers as
efficiency-producing structures. Id. at para. 98. See generally H. HOVENKAMP, sUpra
note 226, at 191-212. See also 1984 Justice Department Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed.
Reg. 26,823 (1984). The DOJ concluded that given the local ownership rules, vertical
integration would not produce anti-competitive effects. Twelve Station Order, supra
note 21, at paras. 98-102.
235. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at para. 108.
236. 1& at paras. 54-55.
237. Concern Arises in Congress Over FCC Ownership Action, BROADCASTING, July
30, 1984, at 30-31 (July 30, 1984). The article notes that Rep. Timothy Wirth (D.
Colo.), Chairman of the House Telecommunications Subcommittee, told Fowler that
his committee doubted that the antitrust laws could adequately protect diversifica-
tion. I& at 31.
238. See Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-396, § 304, 98
Stat. 1369, 1423 (1984).
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promulgated a modified Twelve Station Rule on February 1,
1985.=
On reconsideration, the FCC added an audience reach cap
equal to 25% of the national audience.2 4 Since each of the
three major networks currently reaches about 20% of the na-
tional audience through its owned and operated stations,241 the
cap curtails the ability of these networks to grow significantly
larger. In addition, the new rule distinguishes between VHF
and UHF stations by attributing only half of a UHF station's
audience reach to the cap calculation.24 The FCC inserted
other provisions to encourage minority ownership of stations.2 3
Finally, the rule is intended to be permanent; the Commission
deleted the six-year sunset provision.2 "
The Commission's opinion on reconsideration was laconic. It
devoted more time to reasserting the validity of the original re-
peal of the Seven Station Rule than it did to explaining the
newest modifications. The Commission stated that the audi-
ence cap was added to account for the differences in size among
local markets. 45 The Commission's goal was to prevent the
larger group owners from growing even larger by acquiring sta-
tions in the largest markets, leaving the smallest group owners,
locked into the smaller markets, to fall farther behind.24 The
UHF exception similarly was an attempt to bring less attractive
properties into the development of new networks. 7
Commissioner Dawson had dissented vehemently in the Au-
gust Order, arguing that an audience reach cap alone best ad-
vances diversification interests. 4 . She observed that a
percentage cap by itself would most likely produce groups of
relatively equal size and no group owner would dominate.249 In
239. Twelve Station Order Reconsidered, supra note 23.
240. Id, at para. 3
241. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21 (dissenting statement of Commissioner
Mimi Weyforth Dawson).
242. Twelve Station Order Reconsidered, supra note 23, at paras. 42-44.
243. Id at para. 45. The amendment permits an ownership interest in as many as
14 stations in a category if at least two are minority controlled.
244. Id at para. 3.
245. Id at para. 36.
246. Id
247. Id at paras. 42-44. Ironically, the opinion notes: "We find that the discount
system adopted herein properly reflects the Commission's historical concern with
UHF television." Ad at para. 44. See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Commission's early lack of concern for UHF stations.
248. See supra note 241.
249. IM
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the February Order, she concurred in part.2M She reiterated
her approval of the audience cap, but pointed out that the nu-
merical cap continues to handicap smaller group owners, "since
those group owners will almost certainly reach the numerical
cap long before they reach the percentage cap."1
2. A Passive DiversfTcation Policy
In the Twelve Station Order, the FCC examined the proposed
repeal of the Seven Station Rule in light of its effects on both
the diversification of viewpoints and economic competition.'
The Commission, in keeping with its own definition of the pub-
lic interest, seemed to pay most attention to the effects on di-
versification of viewpoints. The Twelve Station Order,
however, departs from prior FCC policy by adopting a passive
approach to diversification.
The FCC has traditionally operated under the belief that the
effects of ownership concentration on the available diversity of
viewpoints is impossible to measure.253 The motivating princi-
ple has thus been that more outlets for voices are necessarily
better than fewer. In the Twelve Station Order, on the other
hand, the FCC proposed to repeal the ownership limits based
on a survey of the sheer numbers of outlets available,2m and
based on incomplete and biased studies of the effect of group
ownership on viewpoint quality provided by interested
broadcasters.2s
The sheer increase in the number of outlets alone does not
accurately indicate the extent, if any, of the increase in view-
point diversity. Many of those new outlets will offer duplica-
tive programming if owned by a group owner, if affiliated with
250. Twelve Station Order Reconsidered, supra note 23 (separate statement of
Commissioner Mimi Wayforth [sic] Dawson Concurring in Part).
251. 1d On the date the Twelve Station Order Reconsidered was released, Febru-
ary 1, 1985, the Taft Broadcasting Company announced an agreement to buy five tele-
vision stations and seven radio stations from Gulf Broadcasting Co. The sale will raise
Taft's holdings from seven to twelve TV stations, and from thirteen to twenty radio
stations. The audience reach of its TV stations will increase from 9% to 15% (appar-
ently not accounting for UHF stations). See Toft to Buy 12 Stations From GufBroad-
cast, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1985, at 19, col. 5. Commissioner Dawson seems to have been
correct: Taft has reached the numerical cap long before reaching the audience reach
cap.
252. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at paras. 24-63 (viewpoint diversity), 64-
86 (economic competition).
253. See supra notes 97-98, 130-33 and accompanying text.
254. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at paras. 34-3.
255. Id. at paras. 44-59.
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one of the networks or, in the case of radio, if programming is
purchased from a packaged format supplier. The FCC did not
offer statistics on the increase in the number of owners since
the Rule was passed, or in the respective ratios of owners to
outlets.
The studies offered on the effects of group ownership on
viewpoint quality rely in part on flawed premises. The Park-
man study noted that group-owned stations have higher local
news show ratings.2-" But the audience-rating criterion fails to
take into account the well-known habit of viewers of watching
a program just because they decline to change the channel.
The news show ratings are therefore in part a rating of pro-
grams preceding and following the show.
The National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB") offered
its own study showing that group-owned stations provide more
local news and public affairs programming. Whether certain
issues are covered at all, or in depth, is relevant to viewpoint
diversity. Measures of quantity alone, though, do not also mea-
sure the quality and diversity of the opinions expressed.
The FCC also cited a study provided by NAB which con-
cluded that many group-owned stations pursue editorial poli-
cies independently of the group-owner.m The fact that a
separate editorial board is in place to make day to day decisions
is some evidence of editorial independence. The group-owner
will nonetheless exert some controlling influence through hir-
ing choices and through other organizational and financial
pressures.
All of the studies also suffer from a myopic attention to news
programming as the relevant measure of diversity. True, news
programming is the most obvious manifestation of a program-
mer's viewpoint, but not by any means the only one. The deci-
sion whether or not to air, or if aired, whether or not to edit, a
series such as MASH or a documentary such as Death of a Prin-
cess, is an editorial decision which affects, and is affected by the
station's overall viewpoint.
The studies submitted only reinforce the previously-accepted
premise that it is impossible to measure accurately the effects
of ownership concentration on viewpoint diversity. The prem-
256. Id at para. 44.
257. Id. at paras. 45-46.
258. Id. at para. 52.
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ise follows from an understanding of what is at stake in the
marketplace of ideas. It is important not just to report most or
all of the news, but to report the news from a variety of per-
spectives, to comment and debate on the issues raised, and to
see and hear the innumerable other experiences and ideas gen-
erated by modern living. Therefore, as the FCC once stated:
A proper objective is the maximum diversity of ownership that
technology permits in each area. We are of the view that 60
different licensees are more desirable than 50, and even that 51
are more desirable than 50. In a rapidly changing social cli-
mate, communication of ideas is vital .... No one can say that
present licensees are broadcasting everything worthwhile that
can be communicated. 59
In other words, the FCC cannot reasonably retreat from a
policy of affirmatively advancing the diversification of media
viewpoints. The Twelve Station Order adopts a purely defen-
sive posture. The only limits the FCC would have imposed on.
ownership concentration were the antitrust laws and ad hoc
oversight by the FCC through license application hearings. As
noted above, the FCC has equated "diversification" in the li-
cense hearing context with what is enforceable through the an-
titrust laws. 260 The antitrust laws, however, are inconsistent
with a first amendment policy of diversification.28 Although
the FCC reconsidered the Twelve Station Order, it did so only
under strong public pressure. It may well attempt again to re-
peal the ownership limits. Even under the Twelve Station Rule
as it now stands, the FCC has vindicated in part an approach to
diversification that uses market economics as the standard.
V
Antitrust Enforcement
The legislative history of the Sherman Act has been inter-
preted to advance various, often conflicting policies. Judge Rob-
ert Bork, 2 for instance, and Judge Richard Posner26 less
polemically, have asserted that the Sherman Act's main con-
cern is with the economic inefficiencies of monopolies and car-
259. Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 22
F.C.C.2d 311, para. 21 (1970).
260. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
261. See infin notes 262-328 and accompanying text.
262. Bork, upra note 119.
263. R POSNER, ANTITRusT LAw 23 (1976).
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tels. Others have argued that the Sherman Act is intended to
redistribute wealth (and power) from large firms to consum-
ers;264 that it should protect small businesses;2" or that the Act
should advance the goals of justice.m Currently, the view that
the antitrust laws should serve only to advance the efficient al-
location of resources dominates antitrust scholarship and gov-
ernment enforcement policy.27
Allocative efficiency is intended to maximize consumer wel-
fare.2" Under this approach everyone is a consumer, and the
goal is to allocate the total resources of society in as efficient a
manner as possible.29 One way of conceptualizing allocative ef-
ficiency has been by reference to "potential Pareto-efficiency."
Potential Pareto-efficiency states the proposition that if the
gainer's gains exceed the loser's losses, the transaction is effi-
cient whether or not the gainers actually compensate the
losers.-' 0 For example, vertical integration of the chain of dis-
tribution is generally favored under principles of allocative effi-
ciency; organizational efficiencies benefit the firm and
consumers even though smaller competitors are harmed."' By
measuring resources on a social scale, and by defining everyone
as a consumer, allocative efficiency is indifferent to who gains
and who loses, so long as the overall cost/benefit analysis is
positive. 2
A simpler statement of the goals of allocative efficiency is
that low prices and high output are desired .2 3 A monopoly--or
rather monopoly pricing-is inefficient in this respect because
the monopolist may command artificially high prices as she
reduces output. There is a net social cost in that at the higher
prices, some consumers forego transactions that once had prior-
ity and would have produced the largest social benefits. That is,
desires are not satisfied that might have been. There is addi-
tional loss to the extent that the wealth transfered to the mo-
264. Lande, supra note 119.
265. Id. at 103; Bork, supra note 119, at 10.
266. Schwartz, 'Justice"and Other Non-Economic Goals ofAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 1076 (1979).
267. Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1 (1982).
268. Id. at 3-4.
269. See generally H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 226, at 46-48.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. I
273. Id. at 49.
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nopolist ("neutral" in and of itself) is wasted in an effort to
entrench the monopoly. 4
A monopoly, in and of itself, is not the evil. Monopoly pric-
ing is the evil. " A monopoly gained through sheer skill and
efficiency is not condemned under goals of allocative efficiency.
If the firm is efficient, consumers are better off because prices
are at their lowest. The fact that there is only one or a few
producers is irrelevant.276
Bigness is not necessarily bad because large firms in a rela-
tively concentrated market indicate that they have tapped sig-
nificant economies of scale.A The networks are one example
of an industry in which economies of scale in distrubition have
been tapped. In the auto industry, the "Big Three" have mobil-
ized economies of production. As the FCC realized, economies
of scale are important to the economic progress of an indus-
try.7s Under the principles of allocative efficiency, the anti-
trust laws should be wielded primarily to prevent firms from
combining to lower output and raise prices to artificially high
levels.279 The antitrust laws under this approach seek to attack
collusive agreements directly, and to prohibit levels of concen-
tration in a market that would permit tacit, undetectable collu-
sion.2s The antitrust laws, then, do not seek to limit size for
the sake of limiting size.
The antitrust laws can and have failed to reach large, very
powerful, but extremely efficient firms. Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act 28' prohibits collusive agreements. Section 1 should be
as effective a deterrent to collusive behavior among broadcast-
ers as it is in any other industry. Illegal price-fixing is as illegal
under Section 1 among broadcasters as it is, for example,
among oil producers.282 But proving an "agreement" is as diffi-
274. Id. at 19-21.
275. Id. at 30; R. PosNER, supra note 263, at 8.
276. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 226, at 30; R. POSNER, supra note 263, at 8.
277. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 226, at 30.
278. See supra notes 172-80, 229-32 and accompanying text.
279. R. POSNER, supra note 263, at 28-30.
280. Id. See also H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 226, at 31.
281. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
282. Compare United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 507 F. Supp. 412
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (preliminary injunction granted against pay-TV joint venture agree-
ment on grounds that it constituted a per se illegal price-fixing and boycott agree-
ment) with United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (gasoline
purchase agreement among competitors per se illegal price-fixing).
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cult in the context of the broadcasting industry as elsewhere.M
In any case, express collusion is not the special concern of the
diversification policy.
More problematic with regard to both antitrust enforcement
and the broadcast industry is oligopoly behavior An oligopoly
is a small group of nearly identical firms controlling the lion's
share of a particular market.2s The cereal industry and the
broadcast networks are examples. Oligopolies have been called
"shared monopolies" because the tendency is for the firms to
act, though without express agreement, as a single monopo-
list.2m Each tends to adopt prices, output levels and business
practices that reduce output, raise prices, and inflate profits."
Oligopoly behavior tends to fall between the cracks of Section 1
and Section 2 prohibitions. The-collusion is tacit, and so a Sec-
tion 1 claim is difficult to prove in court. 7 Section 2 is directed
at single-firm monopolization.2" Since in an oligopoly each
firm alone usually has insufficient market power to monopo-
lize, any Section 2 claim usually fails.2 9 Professor Turner has
argued that such tacit collusion is inevitable in an oligopoly and
can only be remedied by breaking up the firms. ° Judge Pos-
ner, on the other hand, has insisted that an oligopoly comes
into being because of substantial economies of scale.-' Divesti-
ture would create greater social losses than gains. Thus, under
Posner's thesis, antitrust enforcers should attempt to identify
collusive business practices and control the oligopoly by elimi-
nating the facilitating schemes.- 92
Turner's approach would require an amendment to the anti-
trust laws and so far none has materialized. Posner's thesis was
recently tested in collateral fashion by the Federal Trade Com-
283. See NCCB v. FCC, 555 F.2d at 959 (noting the difficulty of proving anticompeti-
tive practices among media owners, citing S. BARNETT, CROSS-OWNERSHIP OF MASS
MEDIA IN THE SAME CITY: A REPORT TO THE JOHN AND MARY MARKLE FOUNDATION
(September 23, 1974)).
284. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 226, at 92.
285. Id. See also Turner, Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Poli-
cies, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1207, 1225-31 (1969).
286. Turner, supra note 285, at 1225-26.
287. Id. at 1226-27. See also Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sher-
man Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655 (1962).
288. See supra note 126.
289. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 226, at 92.
290. Turner, supra note 285, at 671.
291. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1562, 1571 (1969).
292. Id
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mission in a claim for unfair business practices under Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act w against the anti-knock
compound oligopoly.2 4 The Second Circuit rejected the ap-
proach and held that, at least with respect to a claim for unfair
business practices under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, the FTC must show an intent to restrain trade, or
the absence of a legitimate business purpose. Proof of industry
market structure and facilitating practices was not enough. 
2
"
The Department of Justice attempted to attack the network
oligopoly through claims under both Section 1 and Section 2 of
the Sherman Act. In December 1974, it sued ABC, CBS and
NBC in separate actions, alleging that the control each of the
networks asserts over the production, acquisition and exhibi-
tion of prime-time programming is an attempt to monopolize,
and further, that the uniform contracts used by the networks
for the purchase of programs are agreements in restraint of
trade.2 In 1976, DOJ and NBC proposed a consent judgment.
The settlement was approved in 1978.7
The consent decree places certain limits on the ability of
NBC to contract for exclusive rights to programming, for op-
tions, for syndication rights, and for requirements that in-
dependent programmers use NBC production facilities.29 In
addition, it limits the amount of prime-time programming that
NBC may produce in-house.' Many of the decree's provisions
are to lapse after a period of time.3 ° Most were also contingent
on the DOJ obtaining similar relief from CBS and ABC. 301
The DOJ did obtain similar relief from both CBS and
ABC. 3°2 The consent decrees are, in fact, identical except that
ABC has been allowed more hours of in-house production of
293. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
294. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
295. Id. at 139.
296. See United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1129-30
(C.D. Cal. 1978).
297. Id. at 1129.
298. Id. at 1131-34. The court noted that the consent decree provisions parallel the
FCC's financial interest and syndication rules imposed on the networks.
299. Id. at 1131. The terms allow NBC to produce two and one-half hours per week
of prime-time programming, 50% more than it had been producing. Id. at 1135.
300. Id. at 1131.
301. Id.
302. United States v. American Broadcasting Co., No 74-3600-RJK (C.D. Cal.), con-
ent decree reptd in 45 Fed. Reg. 58,441 (Sept 3,1980); United States v. CBS, 74-3599-
RJK (C.D. Cal.), consent decree rept'd in 45 Fed. Reg. 34,464 (May 22, 1980).
No. 4]
COMM/ENT L. J.
prime-time programming over the ten-year restricted period
than was allowed to CBS and NBC. ° Not only did the DOJ
failed to diffuse significantly the networks' oligopoly power,
the identical consent decrees in fact create a judicially enforce-
able oligopoly.
Prior to entering its consent decree with ABC and CBS, the
Central District of California rejected the DOJ's Sherman Act
Section 2 claim.Y°4 An action for monopolization under Section
2m requires a showing of market power, and the exercise of
market power." The government attempted to show that
CBS's share of the prime-time market, approximately 33%, was
sufficient to constitute market power. The District Court held
that 33% is not a large enough market share alone to give CBS
market power.-°07 Citing Judge Hand, the court noted that a
60% share might be enough under antitrust case-law." And
while the Ninth Circuit had found market power in shares
around 50%, "special factors" were required, factors the DOJ
had failed to allege.'O
The network cases show that the Sherman Act, in principle
and in practice, cannot accomodate a diversification policy.
First, though proof of intent to monopolize or of an agreement
to restrain trade is not irrelevant to a diverse broadcast indus-
try, such proof does not address the foremost concern of diver-
sification; that is, size alone in relation to the rest of the
market. Nor can a monopolization claim under Section 2 suc-
ceed in promoting diversity when a Section 2 claim fails against
even the power of CBS. There is little doubt that the television
industry is not now a diverse one, yet under antitrust law, a
single network as large as ABC and CBS together might still
be legal.310 Direct attacks on the oligopoly itself have failed.
303. 45 Fed. Reg. 58,441, 58,443.
304. United States v. CBS, 459 F. Supp. 832 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
305. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
306. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (stating the test for
monopolization as: "(1) [t]he possession of monopoly power in the relevant market
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident").
307. 459 F. Supp. at 835.
308. Id. at 836.
309. Id
310. The 25% audience reach cap adopted by the FCC under Congressional goading
can be taken as affirmation that the market share sufficient to constitute market
power under § 2 is far too high in the context of broadcast ownership.
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The Second Circuit has chilled the viability of Posner's ap-
proach. The DOJ only succeeded in gaining judicial sanction
for the network oligopoly. Finally, the length and expense of
antitrust litigation-the eight years it took for the DOJ to get
consent decrees against the networks is not an uncommon de-
lay - raised doubts about its appropriateness for vindicating
first amendment rights. Treble damages and interest can com-
pensate for the delay in recovering economic loss; lost free
speech is not compensable.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act,311 the anti-merger provision, is
more consistent with a diversification policy. The legislative
history of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendment to Section 7,
moreover, expresses a clear concern for concentrations of eco-
nomic power as such.s' - The Act seems intended, at least in
part, to protect small businessmen from being gobbled up or
forced out of the marketplace.313 By protecting competitors
from acquisition-hungry giants, Congress seemingly tried to
prevent the accretions of political power that might threaten
democratic institutions. 14 The Sherman Act had proved to be
inadequate for the task.3 1
5
The Supreme Court later remained true to the legislative in-
tent. In two Section 7 cases, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States316
and United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 31 7 the Court struck
down mergers that would have created single firms with mar-
ket shares of 7.2% and 7.5% respectively. In both cases the
Court acknowledged that the merged firm would probably be
more efficient. It adhered nonetheless to the congressional pol-
icies of protecting small competitors and of halting monopolies
in their "incipiency."3 ' The Court noted in particular the re-
cent trends towards concentration in both the national retail
shoe trade and the Los Angeles-area grocery trade.1 9
Section 7 would appear to be an antitrust weapon in aid of
diversification. It might be wielded in broadcasting to prevent
311. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
312. Pitofsky, supra note 119, at 1061-65.
313. Lande, supra note 119, at 103.
314. Id.
315. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) (upholding
merger under § 1).
316. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
317. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
318. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 311-20; Von 1 Grocery, 384 U.S. at 275-78.
319. 370 U.S. at 318; 384 US. at 278.
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group owners from acquiring too many stations through acqui-
sition of other station groups. Both Section 7 and the diversifi-
cation policy favor a large number of fairly equal competitors
for the sake of diffusing excess political, not just economic
power.32o
Section 7, however, expressly exempts transactions approved
by the FCC.32 1 Though the FCC may, and should, take its poli-
cies into account in making its public interest determina-
tions,2 Section 7 by itself is essentially impotent with regard to
broadcasting.
Finally, any attempt to inject first amendment considerations
into antitrust enforcement is doomed to failure. In United
States v. National Association of Broadcasters,323 for example,
DOJ alleged that NAB's self-imposed limits on commercial ad-
vertising were an agreement in restraint of trade.32A NAB ar-
gued that the court should consider the public interest in
viewing programming uncluttered by commercials.37' The
court rejected the argument, citing National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States,32 and held that the "public
interest" as defined by the antitrust laws is served solely by in-
creased economic competition."z The court refused to re-inter-
pret the antitrust laws to advance any other public interest
goals. 32
VI
The Future of Diversification
A. The Marketplace
The antitrust laws cannot advance the free speech principles
underlying the FCC's diversification policy. In an unregulated
free market economy, the vast economies of distribution at-
tendant in broadcasting are likely to produce a handful of large,
320. See supra notes 113-29 and accompanying text.
321. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
322. The Commission may take antitrust policies into account in making licensing
decisions, but it does not have the authority to enforce the antitrust laws as such. FtC
v. NCCB, 436 U.S. at 795.
323. 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982). See also United States v. National Ass'n of
Broadcasters, 553 F. Supp. 621 (D.D.C. 1982) (affirming consent decree).
324. 536 F. Supp. at 154.
325. Id at 166.
326. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
327. 536 F. Supp. at 167.
328. Id
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powerful programming voices speaking through myriad local
outlets. The antitrust laws cannot prevent this; in fact, current
economic policy encourages it. Diversification, on the other
hand, should be an affirmative policy aimed at creating as many
viable and equally powerful voices speaking via the airwaves as
possible. The FCC should not equate diversification with free
market competition.
The Twelve Station Rule is not an unreasonable attempt to
promote diversity. The Rule acknowledges at least that merely
increasing the diversity of broadcast licensees at the local level
will not increase the diversity of programming available if the
local broadcasters are merely serving as conduits for a few ma-
jor programming distributors. If the economics of distributing
programs and advertisements requires network arrangements,
then the FCC should be promoting competition at the network
level. Commissioner Dawson's comments are well-taken,
though: the Twelve Station Rule evidences too great an interest
in protecting the established networks and too little in aiding
the smaller entrepreneurs.3-9 The rule does not seem likely to
produce more than one or two direct competitors for the estab-
lished networks.
Cdmpetition is increasing, though, and is putting pressure on
the networks. The Twelve Station Rule has spawned some of
that pressure, to which the purchase of ABC,3m Ted Turner's
attempted purchase of CBS,m' the recent purchase by Taft
Broadcasting Co.,332 and Rupert Murdoch's announced inten-
tion to build a fourth network,"3 all attest. Much of the compe-
tition, on the other hand, seems to be coming from new video
delivery technologies. Millions of VCRs,3N for example, and
thousands of cable systems offering dozens of channels= are
offering alternatives to prime-time network programming.
B. DBS: The Marketplace as Laboratory
It remains to be seen what effect nascent technologies like
DBS or LPTV will have on the ability of speakers to find new
329. The Commission has often been criticized as being "overidentified" with
vested broadcasting interests. See Bazelon, supra note 66, at 239.
330. See BROADCASTING, Mar. 25, 1985, at 31.
331. See BROADCASTING, June 10, 1985, at 87.
332. See upra note 251.
333. See BROADCASTING, June 17, 1985, at 38, 40.
334. Twelve Station Order, supra note 21, at para. 35.
335. Id
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audiences, and of audiences to find new speakers. Aside from
the ministerial matter of allotting spectrum space and granting
licenses, the Commission has taken a largely hands-off ap-
proach to these new technologies. DBS serves as a striking
example.
A DBS, or direct broadcast satellite, system permits the sys-
tem operator to transmit a video signal via satellite directly to
individual homes sporting small, one-meter wide receiving
dishes.' Satellite transmission enables the operator to reach
an audience throughout an entire time zone, or throughout the
entire country.3 7 And like a cable operator, the DBS operator
can offer several channels of programming at once. 33s It is the
most pervasive broadcast technology to date. While approving
most of the interim DBS regulations, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals observed:
DBS, with its power to reach into every home in the United
States, has a potential impact on Americans far in excess of the
limited radio services that prompted passage of the Radio and
Communications Acts. This impact is only heightened by the
Commission's interim decision to allow a DBS owner to retain
control over the programming on several channels.'
The interim regulations, except for technical matters, leave
DBS almost entirely unregulated.3 ° The Commission did not
impose any multiple-channel or cross-media ownership restric-
tions on DBS operators." The Commission again stated that
increased competition in the video marketplace obviated the
need for stringent oversight.3 In addition, the FCC was afraid
that added regulatory burdens might quash investment in a ser-
vice with extremely high start-up costs.s43 The FCC noted too
that an unregulated DBS market would better serve as an ex-
periment in the untested service's technological and economic
336. DBS: The S4mce Race Is On, CHANNELS 12 (Nov./Dec. 1983). See also F.
SETzER, B. FRANCA, W. CORNELL, POLICIES FOR REGULATION OF DrREcT BROADCAST
SATELLITES, FCC OFFICE OF PLANS AND PoucY STAFF REPORT 7-8 (Oct. 2, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as OPP STAFF REPORT]; and see B. PATrAN, TECHNICAL ASPECTS
RELATED TO DtEcr BROADCAST SATELLITE SYSTEMS, FCC OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLODGY REPORT (1980).
337. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d at 1197.
338. Id at 1207.
339. Id at 1202.
340. DBS Order, supra note 18.
341. IM at paras. 96-98.
342. Id. at para. 91.
343. Id. at para. 96. Typical start-up costs range from one-half to three-quarters of
a billion dollars. NAB v. FCC, 740 F.2d at 1206.
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viability.3" Finally, the FCC claimed that "[i]n any case, ex-
isting antitrust laws would provide adequate protection against
possible abuses of market power due to horizontal concentra-
tion of control."34
The Commission cannot accurately predict the future of a
nascent communications technology such as DBS. The FCC
must be an experimenter; its enabling Act mandates it.-" The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals 347 and the Supreme
Court3w have sanctioned the FCC's discretion to adapt regula-
tions in novel ways to new technologies. Moreover, courts have
held consistently that the FCC may employ market forces
themselves as "regulatory tools."3 ' 9 The broadcast marketplace
may serve as the FCC's laboratory for regulatory experiments.
If the FCC is to experiment, however, it must have means of
monitoring the results of its policy tests. All too often the FCC
has been faulted on just this account. Circuit Judge Mikva, for
instance, in affirming in part the DBS ownership regulations,
expressed his concern over the lack of data presented by the
FCC on the market forces affecting its DBS decision. ° He
nonetheless upheld the rules as within the FCC's discretionary
power to encourage new technologies.351 The General Account-
ing Office, in a report on the FCC's handling of deregulation in
the international telecommunications markets, also noted its
concern that the Commission was relying too heavily on a com-
petitive market to regulate for it without putting into place ad-
equate systems for monitoring. 5 2 The FCC, therefore, must
establish a system for monitoring the effects of its decisions on
the diversity of the marketplace.
The FCC in pursuit of new technologies may not ignore long-
standing policies either. Judge Mikva reminded DBS operators
and the FCC alike that diversification remains a vital FCC pol-
icy. Both were warned to be prepared for regulatory action if
344. Id. at paras. 78-81.
345. Id. at para. 95.
346. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1984).
347. NAB v. FCC, 740 F.2d at 1200.
348. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. at 219-220.
349. NAB v. FC, 740 F.2d at 1200.
350. Id. at 1208.
351. Id. at 1207-08.
352. FCC Needs to Monitor a Changing International Telecommunications Mar-
ket, General Acounting Office, RCED-83-92 (Mar. 14, 1983).
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the Commission's premises failed. 3
The problem here is that the pace of technological change is
increasing rapidly. Left unregulated, with only the antitrust
laws and ad hoc FCC oversight as available defenses against ex-
cessive broadcasting power, it is possible, even probable, that
vested economic interests will become entrenched before the
FCC can perceive the need to act, much less act. Furthermore,
the FCC has always been loathe to divest broadcast owners of
properties, the ownership of which may be antithetical to the
public interest. In establishing local multiple ownership rules,
for example, the FCC has routinely "grandfathered" existing
combinations for the sake of "stability."''  The FCC may be-
lieve itself forced to accept a future status quo, and will feel
itself unable to alter it despite its diversification policy.
C. Promoting Technologies of Diversification
The FCC cannot rely on short-term remedies. On the other
hand, changing technologies require that the FCC permit ex-
perimentation, both with new technologies, and with estab-
lished television and radio systems competing with and taking
advantage of technological changes. But the experiment must
be controlled.
The FCC should first define its long-range goal for a commu-
nications industry structure. If that structure is to serve best
the public's interest in the free dissemination of, and access to,
ideas and experiences, it must be as diverse as technology and
economics permit.
Experience has shown that the economics of broadcasting
technology are conducive to economies of large scale distribu-
tion. Broadcasting is a public good; that is, it costs the broad-
caster as much to transmit to a thousand consumers as it does
to transmit to one.s The costs of production do not increase
with the costs of consumption.3s  Public goods are in general
compatible with natural monopolies.3s 7 Cable television
franchises are one example. The telephone system, at least on
the local level, if not on the national level, is another example.
353. NAB v. FM, 740 F.2d at 1208-09.
354. Newspaper/TV Order, supra note 7.
355. See generally B. OWEN, J. BEEBE & W. MANNING, supra note 173, at 18.
356. 1d
357. Id
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Such monopoly arrangements are simply the most economi-
cally efficient means of delivering a public good.
Satellite technology suggests the ability to create very
cheaply systems tapping economies of scale on a level never
achieved before. The continental range of a single DBS system
points to such a possibility. Yet, satellite technology, and cable
television technology, also offer for the first time significant
possibilities for economies of small scale. A local station or a
group of stations, for instance, might fairly cheaply arrange to
carry the program of an independent producer transmitted via
satellite. The distribution channels of the large network opera-
tors are avoided. Through program choices, local stations could
thereby become strong editorial voices in their respective com-
munities. In addition, fiber optic cable technology, and "pay-
per-view" arrangements currently being tested by cable opera-
tors, offer the possibility that individual audience members
could purchase programming from individual program suppli-
ers in almost the same way that an individual telephone caller
"purchases" a direct communication link to another telephone
user.
3 3
The ultimately diverse video delivery structure, for example,
might be akin to the present telephone system. Each viewer
would have direct access at any time to any available program.
The viewer would pay for each "view" or minute of viewing,
therefore obviating the need for programmers to sell their
product first to mass market advertisers. Each programmer
would have access to every viewer, and each viewer would have
access to every programmer.
There are other medium- and long-range alternatives. The
point is that the FCC should establish and carry out policies
that will favor the long-term development of such distribution
systems. Ultimately, the Twelve Station Rule should be seen
as an interim measure designed to promote some competition
at the network level until new technologies have defined new
market structures. Networking may become obsolete and ad-
vertising may cease to be the main source of broadcasting reve-
nues. The goal should be to develop a viable (perhaps common
carrier) market structure in which ownership rules will be un-
necessary; that is, where network and station owners-the bot-
tlenecks of communication--are obsolete, where a
358. See, e.g., BROADCASTING, Oct.?, 1985, at 53.
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technological infrastructure with virtually unlimited access is
the only medium between speaker and listener. At the very
least, the Commission should create incentives for research and
development in the avenues of satellite and cable technology
that will lead in the direction of systems of small-scale distribu-
tion. It might also subsidize short-term experimental systems
using new technologies, and employing unique combinations of
satellite, broadcasting and cable technologies that will favor
universal, mutual access between viewers and programmers.
VII
Conclusion
It is the FCC's statutory responsibility to protect the public
interest in broadcasting matters. At the heart of the FCC's en-
abling policy is the understanding that in regulating the media
of communication, the government is controlling communica-
tion itself. The very existence of the broadcasting industry im-
plicates the first amendment right of free speech. The FCC,
Congress and the Supreme Court have consequently acknowl-
edged that the public interest requires the FCC to promote af-
firmatively a broadcast environment in which as many ideas
gain access as readily as possible to as wide an audience as is
willing to listen.
In practice the economic health of vested broadcast interests
has been the FCC's foremost concern. The result of its diversi-
fication policy is triumvirate control over the marketplace of
ideas. Now that new technologies are entering the market, the
FCC has decided to let the private broadcast interests them-
selves define the future first amendment environment. Speech
will no longer be free, but will cost what the market will bear.
The fallacy behind the FCC's free market approach to regu-
lation is the notion that the relevant products at issue are news
items, discrete advertisements, and mass-appeal packaged pro-
grams. From the point of view of broadcast owners, that may
be true. But the FCC is obligated to protect the public interest.
From the public's point of view, there are no "products" at is-
sue. At issue is the environment for individual learning and
understanding. Truth is not a fungible commodity, no matter
how far the networks have gone to manufacture it into peanut
butter and potato chips.
The FCC must act affirmatively to keep the channels of com-
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munication open. The antitrust laws are not designed for this
purpose. If the FCC must experiment with new technologies,
and it must, the experiment, like any other, should be a con-
trolled one. On one side, research and development policies
designed to promote economies of small scale should propel
change. On the other, a diversification policy adhering to the
non-economic concerns of the first amendment should prevent
crystallization of media power.

